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ABSTRACT 
There is a growing trend by established firms to use a multitude of External Corporate Venturing 
(ECV) mechanisms (alliances, partnerships, joint ventures, acquisitions, licensing agreements and 
investments in corporate venture capital) to acquire external innovations. In this paper, we develop 
a framework within which firms choose ECV mechanisms that are best aligned with characteristics 
of the target company. More precisely, we investigate the effect of relatedness and uncertainty on 
governance mode choices by combining the Resource-based View of the firm and Real Options 
Theory. We propose a bi-dimensional matrix to show under which conditions of relatedness and 
uncertainty corporations choose among corporate venture capital, strategic alliance, joint venture 
and acquisition. Finally, we present a dynamic perspective to assess how these different forms of 
ECV transit over time, once part of uncertainty is resolved and a certain level of familiarity with the 
new knowledge is achieved.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Researchers have long understood the importance of investments in internal R&D as source of 
knowledge and innovation (Childs and Triantis, 1999; McGrath and Nerkar 2004, Oriani and 
Sobrero 2008). However, these investments provide only a partial contribution to a firm‟s growth 
and profitability leading to a “closed innovation system” in which research projects are launched 
exclusively from the technology base of the firm (Chesbrough, 2003). In a world with strong 
mobility of highly experienced and skilled people, fast time to market and high levels of 
uncertainty, however, considering resources that reside outside the firm‟s boundaries is a vital way 
to achieve competitive advantages and spawn innovation. Chesbrough (2003: xxiv) pointed out that 
to shift from a closed to an “open innovation system” “[…] firms can and should use external ideas 
as well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as the firms look to advance 
their technology.”. This is confirmed by Peter Drucker (2008, p. 799) who suggested that “[t]he 
search for innovation needs to be outside of the ongoing managerial business”.  
Firms generally resort to a wide range of mechanisms to rejuvenate their business models by 
exploiting external resources. These external corporate venturing (ECV) mechanisms include 
alliances, joint ventures, acquisitions, licensing agreements, collaborations with universities and 
investments in corporate venture capital (Roberts and Berry 1985; Arora and Gambardella, 1990). 
In presence of this broad variety of governance modes, it is critical for corporations figure out 
which ECV mechanism they should choose.  
We propose a framework based on two theoretical perspectives - the Resource Based View 
(RBV) and Real Options Theory (ROT) - to address this issue. We complement such perspectives 
with insights from interviews with some of the bigger corporations engaged in external venturing 
activities. More precisely, we suggest that the decision making process needs to refer to two 
attributes characterizing the target company of the collaboration: the level of relatedness with the 
partner (as suggested by the RBV) and the level of uncertainty surrounding its activities (as 
suggested by ROT). Overlaying these two dimensions, we formalize a set of propositions and we 
propose a new representation of ECV to help firms in the choice of their corporate development 
trajectories by evaluating potential investments and determining when and how a form of external 
corporate venturing is more appropriate than another, as instrument of strategic growth. Our 
integrated framework helps explain why certain types of collaboration proliferate under high levels 
of relatedness and uncertainty, why other types better persist with low relatedness and uncertainty, 
and why still others make more sense with a combination of low relatedness and high uncertainty, 
or vice versa. 
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Finally, we describe the evolution of ECV mechanisms over time. Adopting a dynamic 
perspective based on real options, corporations can figure out how actively manage their 
collaborations by changing the design of the initial governance modes in response to changes in the 
intensity of relatedness and uncertainty characterizing the potential target company. We, thus, help 
firms answering a second dilemma: Once an ECV mode is established, should the firm upgrade the 
relationship into a different mode of collaboration? And if so, how? 
This paper sheds new insights contributing to the previous literature on strategic 
management in several ways. Previous research discussing governance mode choice was limited for 
two main reasons. First, most studies focused on a single governance mode (Gulati and Singh, 
1998; Folta and Miller, 2002; Kogut, 1991; Hellmann, 2002; Chesbrough, 2002; Dushnitsky and 
Lenox, 2005a, 2005b and 2006), or on the choice between two or three different governance modes: 
acquisition and alliances (Folta, 1998; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002; Dyer et al., 2004), equity and 
non-equity alliances (Pisano, 1989; Oxley, 1997), make or buy (Monteverde and Teece, 1982), joint 
ventures and acquisitions (Folta, 1998), corporate venture capital, strategic alliances and acquisition 
(van de Vrande et al., 2006). Second, prior research generally examined ECV choices within one 
theoretical perspective. Kogut (1991), Folta and Leiblein (1994) and Folta (1998) applied the real 
options perspective; Walker and Weber (1984), Williamson (1991), Gulati and Singh (1998) and 
Vanhaverbeke et al. (2002) referred to the transaction cost economics; Kogut and Zander (1992) 
and Zollo et al. (2002) chose the resource-based view.  
We fill these two gaps by connecting ROT to the RBV in order to investigate how firms 
choose among four different types of collaborations - corporate venture capital, strategic alliance, 
joint venture and acquisition. This multi-theoretical framework provides a richer description of 
decision making and allows to improve our understanding of when and how firms create 
competitive advantages through investments in external sources. This addresses the need posed by 
Reuer and Tong (2007) “to better articulate real options theory’s link to other theories in the field 
[of strategic management] and to specify the theory’s appropriate boundaries.”. In particular, ROT 
contributes to other theories in two ways: first, it deeply analyzes the impact of uncertainty on 
investments decisions and, second, it introduces a dynamic perspective by highlighting the 
sequential nature of external corporate development activities. Thus, a real option theory of 
governance modes can complement existing theories because ECV mechanisms face uncertainty in 
different ways, leading firms to use them discriminately to structure their investments. ROT has the 
potential to depict firms‟ corporate development trajectories and explain the heterogeneous 
investment behaviors of firms when characterized by similar set of resources, but facing different 
levels of external uncertainty (Tong and Reuer, 2004).  
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The importance to address the issue on governance mode choices is also driven by the 
evidence that firms tend to manage external investments through separate units aimed to manage 
alliances, venture capital investments, joint ventures, licensing agreements and acquisitions. This 
consideration highlights the need to help firms in deciding which organizational unit is more 
suitable in order to identify, manage and exploit the collaboration with a potential partner. An 
“optimal” organizational separation which reflects managers‟ view of ECV modes as distinct 
activities is, thus, critical to achieve. In this sense, our paper has important managerial implications 
about how to build a nimble infrastructure that allows to respond to opportunities with speed and 
flexibility. The creation of different organizational units to handle different types of opportunities, 
combined with the development of an efficient communicative systems in order to sustain 
interactions among them, is a prerequisite to create and manage external opportunities and succeed 
in uncertain environments.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We firstly provide a definition of ECV to 
circumscribe the context of our analysis. It also reviews the previous literature on ECV based on the 
RBV to highlight the major contributes and gaps. In particular, we focus on the role of relatedness 
in governance mode choices. Second, we introduce ROT by examining the role played by 
uncertainty. This session allows us to characterize ECV modes depending on the level of flexibility 
and reversibility, characteristics that corporations should consider in their investment decisions, 
especially when the level of uncertainty is high. Third, we describe a new taxonomy for ECV 
mechanisms by linking together the RBV and ROT. Then, we depict an investment in external 
sources as a multi-stage process based on the creation and management of real options. This session 
allows us to highlight the second contributions provided by real option theory, that is the possibility 
to dynamically analyze the evolution of collaborative modes over time. Finally, we offer some 
conclusive observations. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON EXTERNAL CORPORATE VENTURING 
A definition of external corporate venturing 
The interest on corporate venturing (CV) is based on the need of large firms to renovate themselves 
through the creation of new opportunities and capabilities instead of focusing on the exploitation of 
their current competencies (Narayanan et al., 2008). The general definition of CV available in the 
literature is based on the classification which distinguishes between internal and external venturing 
(Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). Following this criterion, firms can be split between those nurturing 
opportunities that are already in house (internal venturing) and those financing autonomous 
organizational entities that reside outside the existing boundaries of the corporation (external 
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venturing). More precisely, Sharma and Chrisman (1999) defined internal venturing as “corporate 
venturing activities that result in the creation of organizational entities that reside within an 
organizational domain”, while external corporate was defined as “corporate venturing activities 
that result in the creation of semi-autonomous or autonomous organizational entities that reside 
outside the existing organizational domain”. 
In this paper, we focus on external corporate venturing (ECV). We stylize the definition of 
EVC process as follows. A corporation decides to commit (human and financial) resources in a non-
specified mechanism of EVC to obtain value from a target company and sustain its corporate 
financial and strategic goals. The corporation represents the active player which settles on the 
investment, the target company is the opportunity identified by the corporation and the ECV 
mechanism is the intermediary
1
.  
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
Three theoretical approaches have been generally applied to the study of collaborative 
modes – transaction cost economics, resource-based view and real options theory. Based on these 
frameworks, Leiblein (2003) identified two main streams of research involving the study of various 
organizational governance forms. The first investigates the conditions that favor the use of one ECV 
mechanism in respect to others (i.e. Walker and Weber, 1984; Oxley, 1997); the second describes 
the relationship between governance mode and performance (i.e. McGahan and Villalonga, 2003). 
The former line of research generally follows transaction cost economic theory and argues that the 
optimal form of organization is primarily driven by efficiency considerations (i.e. Williamson, 1975 
and 1985). On the other hand, the prior literature on the performance implications of different types 
of investment has commonly relied on resource-based reasoning (i.e. Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 
1986) by identifying those resources that are more likely to provide competitive advantage. Finally, 
real option theory has tried to relate the choice of organizational governance forms to overall firm‟s 
performance (i.e. Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Kogut, 1991). However, as Leiblein (2003: 938) 
pointed out “little effort has been put forth to link insights from Real Option analysis with insights 
from transaction cost economics (TCE) or the resource-based view (RBV)”. In this paper we 
contribute to this stream of research by investigating the link between the RBV and ROT. More 
precisely, as the choice of organizational governance forms impacts on the corporation‟s ability to 
create and appropriate the value embedded in the target company (Leiblein, 2003), we examine the 
motives and conditions for initiating one form of collaboration rather than another.  
                                                 
1 Note that these forms of collaboration generally create advantage for both the corporate and the target firms. 
However, in this paper we direct our attention only to the benefits created for the corporation. 
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We proceed in two steps. First, we analyze the RBV and ROT separately to identify which 
key-features such perspectives suggest to consider when corporations move toward outside 
opportunities. From the review on ECV based on the RBV, we identified the level of relatedness 
between the corporation and the target company as key-factor, while from ROT the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding the target company seems playing the most critical role. Second, we point 
out that only by assessing the heterogeneous nature of potential target companies along these two 
dimensions simultaneously, corporations can identify the ECV mechanism which better fits with the 
management of that kind of company.  
 
The role of relatedness in inter-organizational relationships according to the resource-based 
view 
Previous research based on the RBV suggests that inter-organizational relationships offer a 
significant source of learning as, through collaborations, firms can combine distinct pieces of 
knowledge by drawing on the resource base of their partners. Thus, the RBV depicts external 
corporate venturing activities as a means to acquire resources to maintain competitive advantage in 
a dynamic market. In this context, the concept of relatedness (or overlap) defined, in the literature, 
as the extent to which two entities are similar is critical. This dimension concerns the degree to 
which the entrepreneurial activities require capabilities and skills that are different from the core 
capabilities and skills of the corporation (Burgelman, 1984). Thus, when the level of relatedness is 
low, the level of dissimilarities between the corporation and the target company is high. 
This feature, which characterizes the relationship between two entities, has broadly been 
used to address two main different issues. The first refers to the analysis of whether and how 
different levels of relatedness between the focal firm (i.e. the corporation) and its external partner 
(i.e. the target company) affect a certain dependent variable such as innovativeness, learning, or 
financial performance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Sapienza et al., 2004; Keil et al., 2008). These 
studies suggested an inverted U-shaped relationship between the level of relatedness and the 
subsequent growth of the focal firm. Indeed, when the knowledge bases of the firms partially 
overlap to each other there are more possibilities of learning. Thus, both too small and too great an 
overlap will inhibit growth. The former because limited knowledge overlap limits knowledge 
assimilation and the latter because great knowledge overlap hampers the creation of new knowledge 
combinations (Sapienza et al., 2004). The underlying idea is that common skills and shared 
languages enable partners to efficiently communicate enhancing learning. On the other hand, a 
knowledge base that is too similar to the focal firm‟s knowledge base may contribute little to 
subsequent learning.  
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The second line of research investigates how firms, given a specific level of relatedness, can 
capture value from their collaborations. In other words, this stream of research answered the 
questions about how different levels of relatedness impact on the firm‟s choice among several 
governance modes (Roberts and Berry, 1985; Folta, 1998; Villalonga and McGahn, 2005; Schildt et 
al., 2005). Roberts and Berry (1985) proposed that when firms decide to entry new and unfamiliar 
markets or technologies, they should prefer organizational modes with a low level of corporate 
involvement. Folta (1998), investigating the motives for initiating equity-based collaborations 
versus acquisitions suggested that partners whose primary business operations are dissimilar should 
prefer equity collaborations over acquisitions because the former allow firms to learn by exploring 
multiple opportunities for the cost of a single acquisition. Vanhaverbeke et al. (2002) suggested that 
a firm has the propensity to acquire the other company if it has similar technological competencies 
or when it is a member of the same industry. On the other hand, when the partner has completely 
new technologies to offer, strategic alliances are a more appropriate way to cooperate. Indeed, it is 
more difficult to assess the value of assets of companies operating in unknown sectors, than in one‟s 
own industry (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993). Also, Villalonga and McGahan (2005), investigating 
the determinants of the choice among alliances, acquisitions, and divestitures, found that when the 
level of relatedness between the focal firm and its partner is high, acquisitions are preferred to 
alliances, and alliances are preferred to divestitures for two reasons. First, greater relatedness 
implies a lower cost of integration. Second, when the partners‟ knowledge bases are similar, the 
level of direct competition between the focal and the target firms becomes greater, thus, enhancing 
the need for protective (i.e. integrative) governance structures. Schildt et al. (2005), analyzing 
several forms of collaborations under the dichotomy between explorative and exploitative learning, 
found that highly integrated forms of collaborations are more likely to lead to exploitative (versus 
explorative) learning where the knowledge base among the partners is similar. This result derives 
from a two-step reasoning. First, starting from the idea that governance modes differ in the degree 
to which they support explorative and exploitative learning, the authors argue that such differences 
exist for two reasons: (i) ECV modes differently support transfer of knowledge, and (ii) ECV modes 
have different costs and time to manage the ventures. These two factors are embedded in the 
concept of integration between the partners. More precisely, close integration is considered an 
important requisite for exploitative learning. Second, the level to which external ventures are related 
to the focal firm determines which type of learning is mainly sustained. The authors suggested a 
negative relationship between relatedness and explorative learning. The more closely related two 
firms are, the more similar firms should be and such a similarity should allow two firms to 
exchange knowledge more easily. Accordingly, van de Vrande et al. (2006) suggested that when the 
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level of technological distance between the partner firms is high, corporations are more likely to use 
less integrated governance modes in order to increase potential learning effects deriving from the 
collaboration.  
Although these studies contribute to our understanding of ECV, they do not address two 
important issues. First, these studies tend to use the same term of relatedness to indicate different 
concepts, thus, creating a strong misunderstanding about the real nuance considered in each paper. 
Indeed, the term relatedness is used to simultaneously indicate „similarity‟, „fit‟, „overlap‟, 
„proximity‟, „synergy‟ or „complementarity‟. As pointed out by Tanriverdi and Venkatraman (2005: 
97), “[d]espite the centrality of the concept of ‘synergy’ in diversification research, existing 
relatedness constructs and measures intended to capture the underlying resource-based synergies 
of multibusiness firms are subject to several theoretical and methodological weaknesses.”. Second, 
they analyze the effect of relatedness on the choice among governance modes separately from other 
determinants. The natural outcome is a positioning of different ECV modes along a continuum in 
which a specific variable (i.e. relatedness or explorative learning) assumes several values. In this 
sense, the typical hypothesis formulated by such studies sounds as follows: “High levels of the 
determinant x is associated with the choice of mode 1 over mode 2, and mode 2 over mode 3”. For 
instance, Villalonga and McGahn (2005: 1188) predicted that “The relatedness between the focal 
firm and the target (or partner) firm is associated with the choice of acquisitions over alliances, 
and alliances over divestitures.”. Similarly, van de Vrande et al. (2006: 357) proposed that “Under 
conditions of high technological distance between the investing firm and its partner, companies are 
more likely to choose corporate VC over strategic alliances, and strategic alliances over 
acquisitions”. Thus, the previous literature misses to deeply investigate the optimal form of 
collaboration when multiple determinants are considered simultaneously creating an orthogonal 
representation.  
In this paper, we try to address these issues (a) by providing a broad definition of 
relatedness, that embeds both the dimensions of similarity and complementarity, and (b) by 
advancing that the level of relatedness is not sufficient to explain ECV modes choice. As far as the 
latter, we integrate the effect of relatedness with that of uncertainty to figure out which combination 
of the two dimensions makes more likely the choice of one ECV mechanism in respect to the 
others. Indeed, we suggest that each ECV mode can be described in terms of flexibility which 
allows corporations to efficiently manage the collaboration when some conditions of relatedness 
and uncertainty are satisfied. In the following, we introduce the role played by uncertainty and 
flexibility for the context of external venturing and, then, we proceed with an integration of the two 
dimensions into a comprehensive framework. 
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EXTERNAL CORPORATE VENTURING UNDER REAL OPTION LENS: THE ROLE OF 
UNCERTAINTY AND FLEXIBILITY 
Real options theory provides a useful framework for analyzing investments whose structure are 
similar to financial options. The key concept is the commitment of an upfront payment that provides 
the opportunity, but not the obligation, to take possession of an asset at a later time. In the context 
of ECV, the initial investment represents the payment required to purchase the option, while the 
later decision to increase the commitment of resources, transfer knowledge, enter new markets, 
develop new technologies (at additional costs) are examples of exercise of the option. One of the 
most important contribution of ROT is to provide corporations with a different manner to consider 
the uncertainty surrounding the underlying asset (i.e. the target company). In contrast to traditional 
views (i.e. the RBV) suggesting that when uncertainty is high managerial discretion is limited, or 
that organizational inertia dominates, ROT asserts that firms can use and benefit from uncertainty 
by investing in options to respond to unstable futures and by managing the investments in a 
sequential manner once uncertainty is resolved (Kogut, 1991; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Kogut and 
Kulatilaka, 2001). Thus, ROT is appropriate for analyzing investment decisions that are 
characterized by uncertainty and managerial discretion (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Kogut and 
Kulatilaka, 2001; Huchzermeier and Loch, 2001).  
Starting from these considerations, we suggest that the presence of uncertainty should be 
reflected in investment decisions, that is, in the choice among several ECV mechanisms. More 
precisely, we assert that ECV modes are differently able to manage uncertainty depending on the 
level of flexibility and reversibility they provide to corporations. Flexibility refers to the possibility 
to make critical decisions in the future when part of the uncertainty surrounding an investment is 
resolved. Reversibility, instead, can be defined as the extent to which corporations can easily exit 
from the investment or decrease the involvement in the collaboration if adverse conditions occur. In 
other words, investments are irreversible when they cannot be fully recovered without incurring 
some exit costs. High levels of flexibility and reversibility are also generally associated to low 
levels of involvement of the corporation in the collaboration and low levels of integration between 
partners (Burgelman, 1984; Roberts and Berry, 1985; Shildt et al., 2005). The former dimension 
refers to how many resources the corporation commits toward the collaboration, while the latter can 
be described as the extent to which the coupling of the operations between the corporate and the 
target company is strong. High levels of involvement and integration correspond to low levels of 
flexibility and reversibility and vice versa. 
Previous research has pointed out the need for flexible governance modes in case of 
environmental turbulence. Lambe and Spekman (1997) argued that in presence of discontinuous 
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technological changes the use of alliances is preferred to both acquisitions and traditional internal 
development. Indeed, the advent of a radical innovation is characterized by low levels of certainty 
about how the new technology will affect the industry. Because a technological discontinuity 
radically changes the industry in which it occurs, corporations need to refine the firm‟s core 
competencies. On one hand, the increased urgency to acquire new competencies leads corporations 
to evaluate the attractiveness of an external technology acquisition rather than internally develop 
such competencies. This allows to decrease the time to market for the development of new 
products. On the other hand, the increased level of uncertainty deriving from a technological 
discontinuity leads corporations to prefer alliances over acquisitions in order to limits costs and 
avoid acquiring superfluous technologies. Only when industry uncertainty decreases and technology 
and market requirements are relatively stable, this preference changes in favor of acquisitions. 
Steensma and Corley (2000), investigating the link between attributes of the technology to acquire 
through external collaborations with the performance outcomes of technology-sourcing 
partnerships, found that technological dynamism and commercial uncertainty increase the 
likelihood to create loosely coupled agreements. Indeed, in such environments the risk to be locked 
into a technology that may not be commercially valuable is high and, thus, corporations should 
prefer collaborations that create real options to defer higher levels of commitments and share the 
risk of failure. Licensing agreements, for example, allow firms to avoid huge investments and 
acquire the possibility to shift to a different technology if the first is not more valuable (Kogut, 
1991). Also joint development provides firms with similar benefits. Acquisitions, instead, are 
positioned at the opposite end of the spectrum as they represent the highest level of commitment 
(Roberts and Berry, 1985). In line with these findings, a study by van de Vrande and colleagues 
(2006) suggested that when a technology is relatively new and its commercial potential is unknown, 
firms tend to delay commitment by using flexible governance modes. As a result, corporate venture 
capital investments are chosen over strategic alliances, and strategic alliances are preferred to 
acquisitions. 
The general explanation underlying these results is that committing prematurely resources to 
a new venture imposes considerable risks because the firm gives up the possibility to wait for new 
information that might affect the desirability and timing of the investment. In this sense, CVC 
investments represent the less involved and integrated form of collaboration as the corporation 
interacts with the investee company by creating a separate fund beyond its boundaries and 
supplying it with a certain stock of resources which is devoted to the investee companies in small 
amounts along a sequential process (Schildt et al., 2005). Thus, small participations in CVC 
investments are like taking an option on know-how of yet uncertain value to exercise if the scenario 
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is profitable (Bowman and Hurry, 1993). This strategy gives the firm high flexibility and 
reversibility in the management of the decisional process because the corporation can decide step by 
step its involvement in the collaboration. Thus, high levels of uncertainty are easily managed over 
time through CVC and the corporation can exploit the benefits of downside risk reduction and 
upside potential enhancement (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Trigeorgis, 
1996; McGrath, 1997; Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999).  
Proceeding with this line of reasoning, non-equity (strategic) alliances can be considered 
less flexible and reversible than CVC. In strategic alliances, cooperation takes place directly with at 
least a business unit and committing a greater amount of resources than in CVC, thus increasing the 
level of integration and involvement of the firms and decreasing the level of flexibility and 
reversibility in respect to CVC investments. On the other hand, strategic alliances can be described 
as more flexible and reversible than equity alliances or acquisitions (Folta, 1998). Strategic 
alliances are cooperative efforts in which separate organizations join forces to share reciprocal 
inputs, but maintaining their own corporate identities. Joint ventures, instead, occurring when two 
firms agree to create a new entity by both contributing equity and sharing revenues, expenses, and 
control of the new enterprise, are characterized by stronger integration and less flexibility under 
conditions of high uncertainty than the previous two ECV modes. Finally, acquisitions have the 
strongest level of integration and involvement as they result in the creation of an organizational 
hierarchy where the corporate firm obtains the majority ownership of the target company. In this 
case, the corporation commits a vast amount of resources in an unique step and cannot decide to 
dismiss the investment if it is not more profitable, except that by occurring in high exit costs. 
Through acquisitions, firms give up high levels of flexibility in place of obtaining the direct control 
of the target company.  
Summarizing, the ability to delay an irreversible investment expenditure is an important 
source of flexibility and affects the decision about how to invest in a new venture. High uncertainty 
incentives to postpone huge investments (McDonald and Siegel, 1986) by adopting flexible 
collaborative modes, while the resolution of uncertainty motivates commitment decisions (Folta and 
Miller, 2002) through ECV modes that require more involvement. 
COMBINING RESOURCE-BASED AND REAL OPTIONS PERSPECTIVES TO 
ANALYZE EXTERNAL CORPORATE VENTURING 
In the previous sessions we pointed out how corporations invest in external opportunities under 
specific levels of relatedness or uncertainty. Now, we combine the two dimensions to figure out 
how corporations invest in external ventures when they are characterized by the same level of 
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relatedness with the target company, but face different levels of exogenous uncertainty, or when in 
front of the same level of uncertainty they are differently related to the target company. To this 
purpose, we refer to the following definitions.  
 
Technological relatedness  
Relatedness can be defined along several dimensions, such as product or manufacturing relatedness 
(Rumelt, 1974, St. John and Harrison, 1999; Cassiman et al., 2005), technological or R&D 
relatedness (Robins and Wiersema, 1995; Silverman, 1999, Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; 
Cassiman et al., 2005), downstream vertical relatedness (Schildt et al., 2005) marketing or 
advertising relatedness (Capron and Hulland, 1999, Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991), managerial 
relatedness (Ilinitch and Zeithaml, 1995; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) and human resource relatedness 
(Farjoun, 1994). However, for the purpose of this paper, we chose to focus on technological 
relatedness for the following reasons. In the previous literature, ECV modes have been often 
associated to the development of innovations and their effect on the innovative performance is 
considered an interesting topic (Ahuja, 2000; Stuart, 2000; Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Dushnitsky and 
Lenox, 2005b). Ahuja and Katila (2001), for instance, suggest that studying acquisitions under the 
technological innovation lens is important as it helps us understand how firms absorb and use 
external knowledge. Similarly, the alliance literature has found that innovative collaborations may 
provide important learning benefits to firms and help them to adapt to technological changes 
(Stuart, 2000; Rothaermel, 2001).  
Technological relatedness, thus, determines whether a firm is positioned in a technological 
segment that has a potential to share and combine resources with another firm belonging to another 
technological domain. Note that, through this definition, we consider similarity and the possibility 
to obtain complementarities among resources as two different concepts. On one hand, similarity 
captures the extent to which two firms have similar inputs and can share common knowledge. 
Indeed, high relatedness implies common skills, shared languages and similar cognitive structures 
(Sorrentino and Williams, 1995) which enable partners to communicate, make marginal 
improvements and refinements of their current knowledge base (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998, Ahuja 
and Katila, 2001; Sapienza et al., 2004) and enhance the firms‟ ability to evaluate effectively the 
value of external knowledge and assimilate it within their organizations (Sapienza et al., 2004). In 
the literature, existing measures typically rely on hierarchical classification system like the Standard 
Industry Classification (SIC), for the market relatedness, and the International Patent Classification 
(IPC), for the technological relatedness. Thus, two businesses are unrelated if they do not share the 
same two, three, or four digits SIC or IPC code, and vice versa.  
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On the other hand, complementarity refers to the extent to which increasing one of the two 
activities increases also the returns of the other. Thus, two firms are complementary if they can 
procure inputs jointly to obtain an output whose whole value is more than the sum of the value of 
both the parts in isolation. Thus, complementarity implies super-additive value of combining 
different activities, characteristic that is not included in the definition of relatedness, where, instead, 
the focus is on similarity between activities. Thus, complementarities can arise both between related 
and unrelated activities. In the literature, there is no generally accepted empirical measure of 
complementarities as they are either difficult to operationalize, or imprecise in defining the value of 
complementarities, or require information for which data is not readily available. An interesting 
measure of complementary is the “stack” representation proposed by Gao and Iyer (2006), where 
several units or “layers” interact to each other according to a strict ordering relationship. Thus, two 
firms are technologically complementary if they operate in adjacent layers (Gao et al., 2008). In the 
software industry, for instance, the stack consists of five layers linked together by the following 
bottom-up order: computer hardware, system software, middleware software, application software 
and services. As firms are generally specialized in one or few layers of the stack, they need to rely 
on other firms for the adjacent layers. This configuration creates a collaborative context where 
providers belonging to different layers depend to each other, and the value of a firm increases if also 
the value of the other firm increases.  
 
Technological uncertainty  
Uncertainty is an exogenous variable which is beyond the firm‟s control and refers to the volatility 
of the expected returns from an investment. This volatility can be ascribed to different sources of 
uncertainty (i.e. market and technological uncertainty). As suggested by Oriani and Sobrero (2008: 
344) “[m]arket uncertainty is related to the variability of the expected level of demand for a firm’s 
products. It depends on exogenous factors, such as the economic cycle, the evolution of customer 
preferences, demographic changes, institutional factors […]. Technological uncertainty exists when 
it is not clear which technology will emerge to dominate in the industry […]. The established 
technology, in fact, often competes with one or more alternative technologies. Under these 
conditions, firms must select which technology to embed in their products and processes to fulfill 
future market requirements […]”.  
Schumpeter (1939: 85) argued that "the making of the invention and the carrying out of the 
corresponding innovation are, economically and sociologically, two entirely different things". Thus, 
while technological invention and commercial innovation remain interdependent, their fusion 
confuses our explanations of their respective processes and contributions to uncertainty. To avoid 
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such confusion, this paper will focus on purely technological sources of uncertainty. Many scholars 
suggested that technological uncertainty, in the traditional product-life cycle representation, peaks 
early, decreases following convergence on a dominant design and increases again in presence of a 
subsequent technological change (Tushman and Anderson, 1990; Klepper, 1997). Thus, uncertainty 
decreases when technology evolves (Fleming, 2001). Through technology-based collaborations, 
firms may be able to adapt to different levels of technological uncertainty embedded in radical and 
incremental technological changes if they have the necessary resources to manage such an 
adaptation (Christensen and Bower, 1996). Microsoft, for example, the dominant pre-Internet 
software provider, has embraced the technological shift caused by the emergence of Internet and 
incorporated it throughout its business. Microsoft, however, did not develop the new technology 
through internal R&D investments, but it gained access to the new technology through different 
forms of technological collaborations like equity financing, licensing agreements, strategic 
alliances, joint ventures and acquisitions. 
Thus, when a firm faces technological uncertainty, adopting an options approach 
significantly increases the benefit to the firm for two main reasons. First, options have greater value 
in new markets where the volatility (and, thus, uncertainty) is greater than in established markets. 
Second, viewing the technological challenge as a series of sequentially exercised options creates a 
milestone-oriented, iterative management process that permits project redirection, advances 
learning, and allows investment to be discontinued when not more valuable (Bowman and Hurry, 
1993; McGrath, 1997) 
 
Choice among different external corporate venturing modes 
When looking at ECV as a business development tool, different approaches can be identified. More 
precisely, based on the above-mentioned definitions, various combinations of technological 
relatedness and technological uncertainty produce different design alternatives. The matrix 
presented in Figure 2 shows four different design alternatives to choose depending on the 
characteristics of the target company in terms of level of technological relatedness with the 
corporate firm and level of uncertainty surrounding its technological domain. As we will explain 
later with a set of comprehensive examples, the concept of complementarity is embedded in all 
these four ECV modes, thus, acting as a precondition for corporations to create collaborative 
relationships with potential target companies. Indeed, the presence of complementarities allows 
firms to create, nurture and harness strategic benefits.  
The vertical axis o the matrix represents the level of technological relatedness (high or low) 
between the corporation and the target company, while the horizontal axis indicates if the degree of 
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technological uncertainty surrounding the target company is low or high. From the intersection of 
these dimensions, a specific ECV mechanism is identified. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
The broad literature investigating the conditions under which corporations choose strategic 
alliances over acquisitions pointed out two important contributions. First, when firms face high 
uncertainty in their environments tend to prefer less integrated organizations with external parties 
and more flexible forms of collaborations such as strategic alliances (Harrigan, 1985; Ciborra, 
1991; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). Ciborra (1991) suggested that environments that require a 
large degree of learning and flexibility will see a prevalence of alliances, whereas acquisitions can 
be expected to be more popular when learning and flexibility is less important. Indeed, under 
conditions of rapid changes, learning, organizational change and quick strategic response ask for 
flexible forms of collaboration because new knowledge expires quickly and timely learning from 
partners appears more appropriate than control through formal, integrated and hierarchical 
organizations (Hagedoorn, 1993; Folta, 1998). Thus, this stream of research highlights that 
uncertain environments are characterized by higher level of learning than stable environments 
which, instead, are more focused on the immediate exploitation of synergies between corporate and 
external innovative capabilities.  
Second, Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002) also suggested that if firms decide to collaborate 
with external companies in order to search for capabilities that are related to their core businesses, 
an acquisition generates the necessary control and power in the decision making process. High 
levels of integration and control are particularly important when the target company is close to the 
core business of the corporation in order to allow corporations to directly manage and immediately 
exploit the benefits deriving from positive synergies and shared resources, competencies and 
knowledge (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002). Indeed, a crucial 
advantage of acquisitions is the speed of entry into markets and technological fields. Thus, when the 
strategic importance of the target company for the corporation is high and has to be immediately 
exploited, corporations refer to ECV mechanisms providing them with high degrees of control to 
maintain over the new business development (Burgelman, 1984; Belderbos, 2003).  
Joining together these considerations, we suggest that acquisitions are more favorable in 
low-uncertain environments, where flexibility is not strongly required, and where the level of 
relatedness is high to easily integrate external know how within the corporation and exploit 
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economies of scale and scope (Hoffmann and Schaper-Rinkel, 2001). This corresponds to the upper 
left side of our matrix. 
 
Proposition 1: When the level of relatedness between the corporation and the target 
company is high and the level of uncertainty surrounding the target company is low, 
corporations are more likely to choose acquisitions as mechanism of external corporate 
venturing. 
 
For instance, EMC Corporation, the world leader in information management and storage, 
acquired in June 2006 ProActivity Software Solution Ltd, a privately held provider of content 
management software for business process management. The goal of this acquisition was to address 
the EMC costumers‟ need to optimize their business processes such as invoice processing, claims 
processing and loan origination. Thus, ProActivity brought to EMC a critical content management 
technology set to augment EMC‟s ability to address these needs through the industry-leading EMC 
Documentum business Process Management (BPM) software suite. This acquisition also enhanced 
EMC‟s lead in bringing Information Lifecycle Management (ILM) to life for customers through 
open software. Avi Fogel, ProActivity Chairman and CEO, said that “EMC is a perfect fit due to 
our clear functional and architectural technology alignment, and our common culture based on 
customer-driven innovation.”. Thus, the presence of high levels of technological relatedness (both 
similarity and complementarities) between the two firms and the low levels of uncertainty 
surrounding these types of technologies allowed EMC Corporation to integrate the new knowledge 
into its existing set of capability and create competitive advantage.  
 
When the level of uncertainty is high, acquisitions are not more suitable as they lack that 
level of flexibility needed in dynamic contexts. Under these situations, CVC investments or 
strategic alliances are more appropriate. Indeed, in respect to acquisitions, these ECV modes are 
characterized by lower levels of control and initial commitment and greater degrees of reversibility 
and flexibility which enable corporations to decide about the collaboration in a flexible way. In 
innovative and turbulent environments, governance mode enabling rapid adjustment to changing 
conditions in subsequent steps is critical (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1993).  
Furthermore, strategic alliances and corporate venture capital are generally deployed to open 
a window on a new technology or an emerging market where the corporation does not possess the 
required set of capabilities to compete. Learning, which implies the search for exploration and the 
absence of direct and immediate exploitative aims (Schildt et al., 2005), is the common feature to 
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these goals. For definition, exploration implies low relatedness and needs flexibility because the 
corporation invests in something new, unfamiliar and uncertain (Roberts and Berry, 1985). As 
previously suggested, CVC investments and alliances are the forms of ECV which better fit with 
this description. Stuart (2000) asserted that when the focus of the collaboration is the search for 
learning, alliances and CVC can be defined as “access relationships” to distinguish them from 
“acquire relationships”. Combining high uncertainty and learning, CVC and strategic alliances 
prevail in the bottom right side of the matrix. 
However, although both strategic alliances and CVC investments have similar 
characteristics, strategic alliances are more appropriate under high levels of relatedness, while 
corporate venture capital is preferred to strategic alliances when the level of relatedness decreases. 
To explain these differences we need to refer to the nature of the relationship and organization 
characterizing such ECV modes. On one hand, several works highlighted that strategic alliances 
help firms access to partners‟ knowledge and resources (Ahuja, 2000; Stuart, 2000; Grant and 
Baden-Fuller, 2004) through a relation based on mutual dependence and resource commitments. 
Thus, the creation of a collaboration in which both partners strive toward shared goals and seek to 
appropriate financial gains and strategic benefits needs the definition of a common goal between 
partners to support the mutual transfer of knowledge (Kann, 2000; Dushnitsky and Lavie, 2008). 
This is more likely achievable if a some degree of relatedness and affinity between the partners‟ 
capabilities exist. The combination of high relatedness and high uncertainty is depicted in the upper 
right side of our matrix. Summarizing, 
 
Proposition 2: When the level of relatedness between the corporation and the target 
company is high and the level of uncertainty surrounding the target company is high, 
corporations are more likely to choose strategic alliances (and corporate venture capital as 
second alternative) as mechanism of external corporate venturing. 
 
In the production of the new technology OLED, several firms launched the creation of 
technological collaborations to jointly develop complex technologies. The technological alliance 
between Universal Display Corporation, an innovator behind displays and lighting, and LG Display, 
a leading innovator of thin film transistor liquid crystal display, has been formed to combine 
different specialized competencies and become leaders in the production and development of active 
matrix organic light emitting diodes (AMOLEDs), which will replace the currently dominant LCD 
panels. Steven V. Abramson, President and Chief Executive Officer of Universal Display said that 
"LG Display has been an excellent partner in advancing flexible OLEDs toward commercial 
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practicability, and our success has been driven by strong, collaborative team work. In just over a 
year, our collaboration with LGD has yielded significant gains in the design and functionality of 
flexible OLED displays and our joint development will drive continued progress". Thus, the 
presence of high uncertainty, as in the case of this new technology, and the existence of related and 
complementary competencies to develop AMOLEDs require the creation of strategic alliances to 
efficiently develop complex technologies as in the case of OLED. 
 
CVC investments, on the other hand, entail disparity between the corporate investor and the 
investee company, identifying an unidirectional flow of resources and appropriation claims from the 
investor to the founded company (Dushinitsky and Lavie, 2008). Thus, a tight similarity between 
the partners is not necessary to make this form of ECV successful. As suggested by Kann (2000): 
“Most organizational types of strategic alliances center around very specific goals, such as the 
development of a particular technological capability or the co-marketing of a specific product (e.g., 
Hagedoorn, 1993). While a corporate venture capital program is typically mandated with a specific 
strategic investment goal, the individual investments are often less specific and are not necessarily 
associated with an ex-ante identified strategic purpose. Rather, corporations tend to invest in a 
relatively diverse portfolio of entrepreneurial firms whose assets or technologies may not reveal an 
immediately obvious fit with the corporate investor’s line of business”. This search for new 
competencies (Brody and Ehrlich, 1998; Keil, 2004; Ernst et al., 2005; Chesbrough and Tucci, 
2004, Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005a and 2005b) requires that the level of relatedness between the 
corporation and the target company should be low. Furthermore, to obtain these objectives 
characterized by high uncertainty, CVC investments generally consist in an initial small equity 
investment in the new venture which serves as the first link in a chain of subsequent investments. 
Since CVC investments are typically staged as traditional venture capital investments (Sahlman, 
1990), the corporation is not obligated to continue funding the investee venture after the prior 
financing round. This gives the firm high levels of flexibility in its investment decisions. Indeed, 
“[s]taging investment as a series of outlays creates the option to abandon the enterprise in 
midstream if new information is unfavorable” (Trigeorgis, 1996:2). Summarizing, the above-
mentioned features make CVC investments preferable under conditions of high uncertainty and low 
relatedness, followed by strategic alliances (lower right side of Figure 3). 
 
Proposition 3: When the level of relatedness between the corporation and the target 
company is low and the level of uncertainty surrounding the target company is high, 
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corporations are more likely to choose corporate venture capital (and strategic alliances as 
second alternative) as mechanism of external corporate venturing.  
 
For instance, Intel Capital, the venture capital arm of Intel Corporation, is investing in 
several companies active in the development of clean-technologies worldwide. Intel focus is not 
circumscribed to a single phase of the value chain of this new and promising industry, but it is 
interested in all the steps, from the energy generation and storage to transportation, consumption, 
transmission and distributions. Recent investments include, for instance, Trony Solar and NP 
Holdings in China, Sulfurcell in Germany and SpectraWatt and GridNet in the US. The strategic 
aim of these investments is to explore and boost Intel knowledge in this emergent and promising 
technological field, develop new sources of power for Intel and drive energy-efficiencies within its 
own products and operations. "There's so much activity (in clean technology) and it takes time to 
figure out where you can have the biggest impact," Eichenlaub, Managing Director of Intel Capital, 
said. Mr. Eichenlaub has had to learn a lot in the last year about how utilities deploy energy and 
how people and companies decide to use it. Thus, the loosely coupled relationship (i.e. low 
relatedness) between clean technology and microprocessors, representing the core capability of 
Intel, and the high level of technological uncertainty surrounding this industry - Maneesh Mehta, 
National Leader of the Cleantech practice with Deloitte‟s Financial Advisory group, said that 
“These are still early days for investing in green technologies. This means both additional elements 
of uncertainty compared to other types of investment, and much remaining room for growth” - need 
flexibility to readapt investments when more information is available and, thus, make CVC the most 
suitable ECV mode. Note that, although the level of relatedness is low, some kinds of 
complementarities between Intel and clean-tech companies exist as asserted by Mr. Eichenlaub: “ 
[…] clean technology is also more and more about software, which is one reason the area is 
attracting so many former technology folks in Silicon Valley. Smart meters are powered by 
software, and if the United States gets around to building a market for trading carbon credits, that 
will be software too”. Thus, relatedness and complementarity are two different concepts that can 
coexist and have different impact on the ECV mode decisions. 
 
Finally, Hurry et al. (1992) and Folta (1998) view minority investments in joint ventures as 
efficient modes to explore market and technical domains that are distantly related. Indeed, when 
firms enter unfamiliar areas of activity, the marginal efficiency of internalizing the target firm 
diminishes. For this reason, joint ventures, defined as the creation of a new entity in which two 
firms dedicate equity for the development of new and shared knowledge, are suitable mechanisms 
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in presence of low levels of relatedness as they allow to create a new entry in the market place 
without incurring in high costs of integration of the new knowledge. Kogut (1991, p. 19) points out 
that “[d]ue to its benefits of sharing risk and of reducing overall investment costs, joint ventures 
serve as an attractive mechanism to invest in an option to expand […]”. Thus, joint ventures can be 
considered real options as one of the parts acquires the right, but not the obligation, to expand 
(through an acquisition) in response to future market and technological developments.  
 
Proposition 4: When the level of relatedness between the corporation and the target company is 
low and the level of uncertainty surrounding the target company is low, corporations are more 
likely to choose joint ventures as mechanism of external corporate venturing. 
 
In the oil and gas industry, joint ventures are really common and are often cooperative 
relationships between a local company and foreign firm. Foreign firms generally form joint ventures 
with domestic companies already present in specific markets where the foreign firms would like to 
enter. The foreign and the local firms contribute different assets and capabilities into the 
collaboration. On one hand, foreign firms more heavily bring into the joint venture new 
technologies, business practices, product design, manufacturing know-how and special equipment, 
while the domestic companies more contribute in the areas of knowledge about and skills for 
dealing with the local government or other institutional infrastructure and efficiently operating in 
the domestic industry. For instance, Texaco and Saudi Aramco formed a joint venture, Star Enterprise, 
with the aim to refine and market Texaco-branded products in 26 East and Gulf Coast states and the 
District of Columbia. The presence of unrelated capabilities (technologies and products for Texaco and 
distribution channels for Saudi Aramco) and a low level of uncertainty (as in the oil and gas industry) 
make a joint venture the right mechanism. Similarly, in the petrochemicals sector, Infineum, a joint 
venture between ExxonMobil Chemical, which have chemical manufacturing and marketing 
operations around the world, and Shell Chemicals, that manufacture and deliver petrochemical 
building blocks to industrial customers, has been established in January 1999 to produce and market 
fuel and lubricant additives for automotive, heavy-duty diesel and marine engines. In a case study 
by (1994: 1492) the authors report that in joint ventures between partners form the US and China, 
the typical comment of the US corporation is that “We have the technology and certain know-how. 
The Chinese partner knows how to make things happen in China. You put the two together right, it 
works”. Also in these examples, the presence of unrelated competencies does not preclude the 
existence of complementarities among the partners involved in the collaborative relationship. 
21 
 
THE TRANSITION OF EXTERNAL CORPORATE VENTURING MECHANISMS OVER 
TIME 
The taxonomy proposed in the previous section depicts under which conditions of relatedness and 
uncertainty corporations are more likely to choose a form of ECV rather than another. In such 
representation, we referred to the first contribution ROT provides to the RBV. That is, firms can use 
and benefit from uncertainty by investing in options to respond to unstable futures. The same matrix 
can also be interpreted as a dynamic tool to understand how ECV mechanisms transit over time 
(Figure 4). To pursue this goal, we refer to the second contribution ROT introduces to the RBV. By 
highlighting the sequential nature of external corporate development activities, ROT recognizes two 
key insights. First, there are opportunity costs associated with irreversible investments under 
uncertainty. Second, many investments create valuable follow-on opportunities. Combining these 
features, external corporate venturing activities characterized by high uncertainty can be described 
as up-front investments which give the management the possibility to both capitalize on favorable 
opportunities and mitigate negative scenarios by proactively confronting uncertainty over time in a 
flexible manner (Kogut, 1991; Kogut and Kulatilaka 2001).  
 
External corporate venturing as a multi-stage process based on real options 
Most of the existing strategic management literature uses the orthodox discounted cash flow 
approach to analyze investment decisions. However, this approach is not adapt when investments 
are characterized by high levels of uncertainty. Under conditions of high uncertainty and instability, 
a certain level of flexibility available through an active management of the investment process is 
critical. ROT satisfies this requirement as it suggests that firms can benefit by investing in options 
to respond to uncertain futures and by managing the investments in a sequential and flexible manner 
as uncertainty is resolved (Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Kogut and Kulatilaka 2001). Accordingly, 
external corporate development activities have been commonly viewed as conferring that 
discretionary in future opportunities typical of a real option framework (Kogut, 1991; Smith and 
Triantis, 1995; Reuer and Tong, 2005).  
A real option, deriving from the analogy with financial options, can be defined as the right, 
but not the obligation, to buy or sell the underlying asset at a specified price on or before a given 
date. However, differently from financial options in which specific contracts determine the exact 
conditions leading to an optimal exercise, real options have to be analyzed taking into consideration 
also what happens between the acquisition and the exercise of the option. Indeed, options based on 
real assets need to be actively managed by the holder from the moment in which the option is 
acquired till its time of maturity. Recent applications of ROT in the strategy field have examined 
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investment decisions in terms of purchase or exercise of particular types of options. However, these 
works do not offer specific frameworks to understand whether and how firms correctly manage and 
capture option value from such investments. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
To fill this gap, we describe an investment in external sources as a dynamic multi-stage 
process based on real options, where each step is functional to the creation and exploitation of 
growth opportunities. We identify four phases of the process (Kulatilaka and Venkatraman, 2001): 
assess opportunities by thinking about the possible future outcomes, acquire options by making 
investments that confer flexibility to make decisions in the future when part of the uncertainty is 
resolved, nurture options by keeping the options alive, and harness value by exercising the options 
in a opportune way (see Figure 3). Disclosing our conclusions, we point out that each ECV 
mechanism manages the phases of this process in a different way. 
Scan opportunities 
The first step of the ECV process is the scan of the external environment to search for growth 
opportunities which give the firm the possibility to support existing businesses, improve internal 
processes, open a window on new markets and technologies, develop new products or seek new 
technological directions (Ahuja and Katila, 2001, Kogut, 1991; Chesbrough and Tucci, 2004; 
Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006; MacMillan et al., 2007). Finding all the potential investments requires 
a definition of the right space in which this search has to be deployed. Indeed, external opportunities 
are not all alike. As previously pointed out, corporations should define their environment to look for 
opportunities along two main dimensions: the level of relatedness between the target company and 
the corporation and the degree of uncertainty characterizing the target company. Taking into 
consideration these two features together allows corporations to go over the traditional view which 
is inclined to sustain local search with high familiarity and low uncertainty in order to exploit path 
dependency (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Also the exploration of new opportunities which reside in 
far and unfamiliar domains and where the level of uncertainty is high can be valuable investments. 
ROT suggests that the benefits deriving from close and stable opportunities could be lower than the 
value created through far and uncertain opportunities, due to the greater value of the options 
embedded in the latter type of investment.  
Acquire options 
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The second step of the ECV process corresponds to the acquisition of the option, that is how the 
collaboration is drawn. As ECV mechanisms are heterogeneous in terms of their ability to pursue 
and manage a specific type of option, alternative governance modes exhibit differences in their 
effectiveness and when they can be used (Nicholls-Nixon and Woo, 2003). This second step of the 
ECV process, thus, refers to the design of the collaborative structure. That is, given the nature of the 
opportunity identified in the previous step, how should firms design the collaboration to acquire the 
option? Corporations have to figure out which ECV mechanism assures the right level of strategic 
agility, control and positioning to capture potential future benefits from the opportunities. 
As previously explained, ROT suggests that ECV mechanisms can be distinguished not only 
on the base of the level of integration and commitment, but also on the base of the level of flexibility 
and the degree of reversibility. More precisely, flexibility is the possibility to defer critical decisions 
in the future when more information is available and part of the uncertainty is resolved, while 
reversibility is the possibility to easily exit from an investment without incurring any costs. 
Summarizing previous results, the levels of flexibility and reversibility assume the greatest value for 
CVC investments, decrease for non-equity alliances, further decrease for joint ventures, and finally 
assume the lowest value for acquisitions (van de Vrande et al., 2006). Based on these features, we 
identified through the matrix of Figure 2 the ECV modes which corporations are more likely to 
adopt depending on the level of flexibility required to manage the collaboration with a specific type 
of target company. 
Nurture options 
While in the case of financial options the acquisition of the option is followed by its exercise in the 
future if the conditions are favorable, in the case of real options, it is needed to introduce an 
intermediate step to manage the option before its exercise. This is the so called nurturing phase in 
which the option‟s holder has an active role to keep the option alive and decide about its 
involvement in the collaboration over time. The possibility to restructure contracts and business 
agreements with external partners depends on the level of flexibility and reversibility of the ECV 
mechanism defined in the previous step. Thus, the initial allocation of resources impacts on the 
nurturing of the option as it defines the starting conditions of the contractual relationship and the 
possibility to dynamically change these initial conditions by adapting the ECV investments to the 
proposed scenario. 
The sequential nature characterizing some ECV mechanisms gives the firms high flexibility 
and reversibility in the management of the collaboration by allowing to evaluate the convenience to 
proceed with the relationship, or change the level of involvement, or abandon the collaboration. As 
24 
 
previously pointed out, the staging process characterizing CVC investments is an useful tool to 
monitor the option over time. Sequential investments provide the investor with more information 
about the likelihood of success of the investment limiting its downside risk (Hsu, 2002). Similarly, 
a strategic alliance can be extended to an acquisition if the value of the partner becomes so high to 
induce the corporate firm to integrate it into its organization through an acquisition (Kogut, 1991). 
The underlying idea is that, if the circumstances are favorable, corporations should increase their 
involvement into the collaborative relationship and subsequently decrease the flexibility and 
reversibility of the investment. On the other hand, acquisitions provide corporations with a different 
scenario. The huge amount of resources committed in the unique initial stage to acquire the target 
company deprives corporations of those levels of flexibility and reversibility characterizing the 
previous forms of collaboration. Summarizing, the structure and complexity of the nurturing phase 
in terms of subsequent investments required to keep the option alive depend on the governance 
mode depicted in the second phase of the ECV process. CVC generally comprises the greatest 
number of nested investments (given by the total number of financing rounds toward the target 
company), followed by strategic alliance and joint venture (where the first of the two investments is 
undertaken to create the alliance/joint venture and the second to acquire, if useful, the target 
company); while acquisition generally corresponds to a compression of the nurturing phase into a 
single step as it has not subsequent follow-ups. We analyze the evolution of ECV modes over time 
in the next session. 
Harness value 
Harness value from the external investment represents the final exercise of the option. After this 
phase the option expires and the benefits embedded in the investment concretely reaches (or not) 
the corporation. If the nurture phase highlights the sequential nature of the options, the harness 
phase is more related to the link between actions and creation of value.  
Two elements are particularly relevant to make this phase successful. First, the assessment of the 
exercise price. Second, the choice of the exercise time. Indeed, the basic decisional rule for growth 
options is that the option will be exercised, at a certain time, if the value of the underlying asset is 
greater than the exercise price. To define the exercise price, we need to look at the previous phases 
of the ECV process. As previously pointed out, when corporations choose a flexible mode of ECV 
to periodically evaluate and monitor the company‟s performance, the nurturing phase is long and 
requires several intermediate steps before reaching the final step – the “harness” phase. On the 
opposite side, in case of immediate acquisition of the target company, the nurturing phase tends to 
be null, due to the absence of the staging nature of the investment. When the nurturing phase is long 
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and articulated, the exercise price is the sum of all the resources invested in the nested phases to 
keep the option alive; when the nurturing phase is short the amount paid to use the knowledge of the 
target company is compared to the benefits deriving from such knowledge.  
Furthermore, unlike financial options in which the expiration date is decided by specific 
contracts, in case of real options, acting at the right time is not a matter of luck. Empirical evidence 
shows that, even if conditions become favorable, several firms are unsuccessful in capturing value 
from their strategic option. This could occur because of the corporate firm‟s inability to manage the 
nurture phase or decide the time to exercise the option. As pointed out by Bowman and Hurry 
(1993), the option‟s strike can be influenced by the firm‟s organizational structure as different 
organization structures influence the extent to which decision makers are left free to strike options. 
This suggestion can be translated to the ECV context. That is, the harness phase is strictly related to 
the type of ECV mechanism designed in the acquiring phase and its structural evolution in the 
nurturing phase. Contractual structures that provide the investing firm with the optimal conditions 
to efficiently capture external signals will show greater ability in deciding the exercise time. 
Moreover, contractual structures that help firms in evaluating whether abandoning certain projects 
because they might not provide the necessary benefits is also important.  
 
Summarizing, the multi-steps representation of ECV activities highlights the following insights: 
 
1. Corporations need to scan the external environment along different dimensions such as the 
degrees of relatedness between their activities and those of the target company and the levels 
of uncertainty surrounding the target company.  
2. ECV mechanisms proceed along manage each step of the process in different manners. 
Thus, each governance mode represents for the corporations a unique tool to use under 
particular conditions.  
3. Under the real options lens, modes of ECV can be described along two dimensions: 
flexibility and reversibility. When the need of flexibility and reversibility is high, firms 
should prefer a loosely integrated collaborative contract which is structured as a staging 
process to progressively allocate resources and change their level of involvement over time. 
On the other hand, when the control is more important than flexibility and reversibility, 
corporations should choose ECV mechanisms which immediately capture the value 
embedded in the external opportunity.  
4. The length and complexity of the nurturing phase depend on how the collaboration is drawn. 
Flexible and reversible relationships such as corporate venture capital or alliances give 
26 
 
corporations the possibility to manage the nurturing phase through a nested structure of 
intermediate steps in which the level of involvement progressively increases. On the other 
hand, acquisitions skip the nurturing phase by directly connecting the second step of 
option‟s creation to the final step in which its value is captured.  
5. The assessment of the exercise price and the maturity time of the option in the final step of 
the strategic option navigator is affected by how the ECV mechanism is chosen and 
managed in the previous steps.  
 
The evolution of external corporate venturing choices over time 
To analyze how ECV modes transit over time, we firstly consider CVC where the level of 
relatedness is low and the degree of uncertainty is high. The choice to start from this case is driven 
by the consideration that CVC represents the most flexible and reversible ECV mode from which 
both relatedness and uncertainty can vary, by defining less flexible and reversible forms of 
collaboration. 
Through this form of ECV, corporations are fully equipped to face all the aspects of new and 
uncertain businesses. Indeed, as previously pointed out, CVC investments are a form of 
collaboration which aims to learn from the target company about new, unfamiliar and uncertain 
market and technological domains. CVC can be, thus, considered the most general explorative 
activity to find out several types of potential partners, as suggested by Pfizer: “Pfizer Venture 
Investments (PVI) serves as the venture capital arm of Pfizer, supporting a variety of worldwide 
business development (WWBD) activities. Using Pfizer capital, we invest in innovative healthcare 
businesses offering new technology platforms that align with our company's strategic direction.” 
(Pfizer website). 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
From this initial condition, three possible paths can be drawn. The first occurs when the 
level of relatedness between the corporation and the target company increases, but the level of 
uncertainty is relatively unchanged. The second corresponds to the opposite scenario (unchanged 
relatedness and decrease of uncertainty). Finally, the third possibility shows a simultaneous 
improvement in the predictability of the environment (decrease of uncertainty) and familiarity with 
the new knowledge (increase of relatedness). In the following, we consider each case separately.  
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Arrows 1 and 2. Once a certain level of familiarity with the new knowledge has been built through a 
constant process of learning, the corporation is in a position to decide whether to allocate more 
resources to the target company and, thus, select a more appropriate mechanism for scenarios with 
greater levels of relatedness between the partners‟ knowledge bases. Folta and Miller (2002) 
examined equity partnerships suggesting that one of the factor affecting the decision to acquire 
additional equity in partner firms is the possibility to obtain further learning advantages to investors 
by internalizing the target and facilitating technology transfer. The corporation can switch from a 
CVC investment to an alliance where the level of flexibility and reversibility is still high, but lower 
than in the previous case (arrow 1). This is the case, for instance, of Bedcton, Dickeson and 
Company (BD), a global medical technology firm, and BD Ventures, its venture capital arm which 
invests in venture-stage companies that fit well with the BD‟s business segments (medical, 
diagnostics and biosciences). Indeed, “[…] several portfolio companies have entered into 
development and other strategic relationships with BD subsequent to BD Ventures’ investment.” 
(Bedcton, Dickeson and Company website). Also Microsoft follows the same evolution in ECV 
modes: “A recent example of a company that we’ve been working with is Tutor.com — an on-
demand tutoring and homework help service that students can use when they’re stuck with a 
homework problem, need to study for a test or want to improve their confidence and grades. […] 
Like most startups, they had limited resources, so being able to use our technology and resources 
was a great help to them. [After an initial set of financing rounds], this summer we took it to 
another level when we announced a strategic alliance with Tutor.com […].” (Microsoft website). 
Subsequently, when also a huge part of the exogenous uncertainty is resolved, the strategic 
alliance can be converted in an acquisition to exploit a full control on the development of the new 
knowledge (arrow 2). Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) suggest that alliances may be formed to 
reduce market uncertainty and enhance industry coordination by sharing costs and risks. Thus, once 
uncertainty has been resolved, corporations may decide to engage in a more hierarchical governance 
mode to obtain strategic control on the partner. “Pfizer Inc. now owns more than 10% of Australian 
nanocap pSivida Ltd., but the pharmaceutical giant has no plans to acquire the drug delivery 
products developer.”. Indeed “[i]t was a contingent commitment by Pfizer at the time it entered into 
the strategic alliance with pSivida […] that it would purchase additional shares if [it was] able to 
go out and raise a certain amount of additional capital […]. Pfizer [typically] enters into these 
strategic alliances and as part of the agreement will commit to purchase some equity. In some 
cases, it's an initial purchase followed by a follow-up purchase.” (Cohen, 2007). Although this is an 
example in which a corporation decides to not acquire its partner, it shows that after preliminary 
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collaborations in the form of strategic alliances, an acquisition could be the natural expansion of the 
relationship to increase control on the partner. 
 
Arrows 3 and 4. A second possibility occurs when only the level of exogenous uncertainty 
decreases making the investment in an external company less risky. Here, the level of relatedness is 
unchanged but the higher stability in the market demand and in the technological trend allows 
corporations to become more involved in the collaboration. CVC investments (or strategic 
alliances) can, thus, become a joint venture where the firms engaged in the collaboration share 
resources to jointly develop new knowledge. Joint venture is appropriate in scenarios with low 
uncertainty and low relatedness, as the two firms commit relatively huge amount of their specific 
and often complementary resources to pursue a common goal (arrow 3). For instance, Pfizer‟s 
philosophy to collaborate is to “[p]rovide genuine value to Pfizer, patients and partners. [The] 
partner [will] be part of a team determining the best path for bringing programs forward. From the 
beginning, we're interested in exploring ways to work together that advance the goals of each of 
our organizations. This can be achieve with initial commitments in equity followed by more 
aggressive strategies like the creation of joint ventures with the most valuable partners or other 
forms of strategic alliances” (Interview with the Head of Pfizer‟s Venture Investment Division and 
Pfizer website). 
Once a certain level of familiarity with the new knowledge has been achieved, the joint 
venture can expand in an acquisition (arrow 4). Indeed, as suggested by Kogut (1991), joint 
ventures provide firms real options to expand sequentially into new markets by acquiring the target 
company. Indeed, firms tend to exercise the option by buying out its partners when the joint venture 
experiences positive results, while it continues to hold onto its investments in the joint venture 
when negative signals materialize (Kogut, 1991). For instance, PepsiCo and General Mills 
established in the year 1992 a joint venture - Snack Ventures Europe (SVE). In the year 2004 
PepsiCo acquired General Mills' 40.5 percent ownership interest in SVE determining the end of the 
joint venture. Now, the operations of the joint venture are wholly owned by PepsiCo. Similarly, 
Fujitsu Limited announced the acquisitions of Siemens‟s 50% share in their joint venture - Fujitsu 
Siemens Computers (FSC) because “[f]ully integrating Fujitsu Siemens Computers into the Fujitsu 
Group fits perfectly into our global growth strategy […]” (Kuniaki Nozoe, president of Fujitsu). 
 
Arrow 5. Finally, if both the conditions simultaneously occur, leading to a decrease of uncertainty 
and an increase of familiarity with the new knowledge, CVC investments can immediately be 
converted in an acquisition. Intel Corporation, through its wholly owned subsidiary Intel Capital, 
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invested through the year 2008 in Imagination Technologies Group with increasing equity stakes 
over time. After these investments, Intel claimed that “Intel Corp. reserves the right to announce an 
offer or a possible offer to acquire the shares in Imagination Technologies Group which it does not 
already own […] if there is a material change in circumstances or in [certain events]” (London 
Stock Exchange website). Similarly, Siemens Venture Capital, the venture capital arm of Siemens, 
started its collaboration with Chantry Networks in 2003 - the leading provider of secure integrated 
mobility management solutions for wireless networks – through venture capital investments. In 
October 2005, Siemens announced its intent to acquire the venture “to offer an integrated enterprise 
network management platform capable of handling the convergence of wired, wireless and voice 
systems.” (Siemens website). 
CONCLUSIONS 
In addition to attractive financial returns External Corporate Venturing (ECV) provides strategic 
benefits which result from establishing strategic collaborations between small entrepreneurial 
companies and large mature corporations. There are several approaches to make ECV. Each 
approach requires a different level of commitment with respect to corporate resources and yields 
specific strategic benefits. In this paper, we address the following research question: how should 
firms invest in external opportunities?  
Figure out which ECV mechanism is more adapt under specific circumstances is a challenge 
for big corporations. To help firms addressing this issue, we propose a theoretical model in which 
the characteristics of the target is a key-element to choose the correct ECV mechanisms. By 
combining the Resource Based View and Real Option Theory, we identify two dimensions - the 
level of relatedness between the corporation and the target venture and the uncertainty surrounding 
the target company – to detail the nature of outside opportunities and define the ECV mechanism 
which better manages a specific type of collaborative relationship.  
The bi-dimensional matrix proposed in this paper aims to be a tool for corporations to 
evaluate investments in outside opportunities and determine when to use external corporate 
mechanisms in an appropriate manner as an instrument of strategic growth. However, the four ECV 
modes shown in the matrix are not to intend as exhaustive. Much room is left for refinement 
through further research. This framework only defines a preliminary conceptual foundation for a 
number of practices which arise in today's business environment. Future research could enrich this 
representation by integrating other dimensions such as the distinction between market and 
technological uncertainty, on one hand, and relatedness versus complementarity, on the other hand. 
First, previous studies on real options pointed out that uncertainty over outside investment returns 
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can be attributed to different sources - unexpected market and technological developments in the 
industry (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Folta and O‟Brien, 2004; Li and Mahoney, 2006; Oriani and 
Sobrero, 2008). This distinction is important to take into consideration whether and how different 
sources of uncertainty change the value of the real options created through external collaborations, 
and thus impact on the choice among ECV mechanisms. Second, the concept of relatedness does 
not recognize that synergies among activities can arise not only from similar resources, but also 
from complementary resources (Tanriverdi and Venkatraman, 2005). Thus, relatedness can be 
defined as the extent to which the collaboration uses common knowledge resources between the 
corporate and the target firms, while complementarity represents the extent to which the 
collaboration uses a complementary set of common knowledge resources between the corporate and 
the target firms. 
Future research could also empirically test our framework with data from different databases 
to investigate how CVC investments, alliances, joint ventures, acquisitions and licensing 
agreements are different to each other depending on a set of variable like relatedness and 
uncertainty. Empirical investigations about the decisional choice among different mechanisms of 
external venturing miss in the literature. Finally, theoretical works in which different theories are 
integrated in a systematic way are scarce. In this paper we have combined the RBV with ROT, but 
also other frameworks such as organizational learning, transaction costs economic or dynamic 
capabilities can be jointly applied to explain this phenomenon. 
This paper has important managerial implications. In the last years, the most common 
strategy pursued by firms is to create successful opportunities to identify, develop and 
commercialize products that bring value to their customers and to the firm itself. To achieve this 
goal, firms have to build a nimble infrastructure that allows to respond to opportunities with speed 
and flexibility. All too frequently large corporations lack the flexibility to respond quickly to 
transform a new idea into a successful product that provides a corporation with new growth and 
financial returns. The creation of different organizational units inside the same firm dedicated to the 
search and management of new opportunities is the starting point of this renewal. The importance to 
find differences between several forms of ECV is pointed out by the organizational structure of 
corporations in today‟s business activities. Indeed, managers typically view acquisitions, alliances 
and CVC investments as distinct entities, and thus they manage them through separate corporate 
units. Pfizer, for example, has a dedicated group to ensure that all the capabilities and resources 
necessary to evaluate and secure licensing, alliance and acquisition opportunities, as well as venture 
investments and investments in innovative, adjacent or synergistic businesses are in one place with 
a clear strategy and accountability for results. However, inside the group there are different and 
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distinct areas with specific competencies: “Venture Investments” to recognize strategic equity 
investments in biotech, specialty pharma, drug delivery, diagnostic and other technology; “Alliance 
Management” has the task to build trust and relationships between partners; “Licensing” is 
dedicated to identify portfolio assets as licensing candidates. From this description, it is evident 
how a clear definition of competencies and resource among units and an efficient coordination 
among different areas are critical elements to obtain value from new external opportunities. This is 
possible only if the characteristics of the target company in terms of relatedness and uncertainty are 
analyzed. With our framework, we intend to help firms in designing their organizations in order to 
create and harness potential value from different external sources.  
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Figure  1. Typical structure of external corporate venturing. 
 
 
 
 
Figure  2. A taxonomy for external corporate venturing mechanisms. 
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Figure 3. The multi-stage process for external corporate venturing activities (Source: adapted by 
Kulatilaka and Venkatraman, 2001). 
 
 
Figure 4. The evolution of external corporate venturing mechanisms over time. 
 
 
 
 
